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 “Stand firm and hold the handrail”, a 
friendly female voice repeats over and 
over on the escalators in the Beijing 
subway. That is good advice in world 
politics too. Don’t be intimidated by 
capricious or aggressive world leaders; 
don’t overreact either; stand firm and 
calmly defend your position. But just as 
one would wish for a handrail in today’s 
volatile environment, there doesn’t seem 
to be one in sight. 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
No. 99 
 September 2018 
 China’s leaders like to project an image of 
cool-headed, long-term decision-making. That 
translates into a dislike of surprises, which is 
why they cannot but dislike the unpredictability 
of Donald Trump, who continuously reverses 
himself and often is at odds with his own 
administration. His antics seem to cause even 
more concern in Beijing, where like in previous 
summers I spent a couple of weeks teaching, 
then back home in Brussels. My Chinese 
colleagues were at least as surprised as I was by 
Trump’s bizarre meeting with Vladimir Putin 
in Helsinki on 16 July. That happened to be 
the first day of my summer course. The US 
president appearing to eat out of the hand of 
the Russian president: that certainly raised my 
students’ interest in my lecture on strategy.  
WHAT IS THE ODD COUPLE UP TO?  
In the run-up to Helsinki, China and the 
European Union (EU) feared the same thing, 
in fact: that Trump and Putin would combine 
against them. Bien étonnés de se/les trouver 
ensemble… The exact nature of Trump’s 
relation to Russia remains unknown – perhaps 
it will be revealed by the Mueller investigation 
into links between Trump’s presidential 
campaign and the Russian government. 
Trump’s business links to Russia are no secret, 
and he does seem beholden to the Russian 
president. Whatever the truth of it, the fact is 
that the US need not fear Russia: although still 
a great power, with a lot of nuisance capacity, 
Russia no longer is in a position to challenge 
American global predominance. Only China 
has that potential, and Trump certainly wants 
to reduce Beijing’s economic power.  
 
This is why some in Beijing expressed their 
concern to me that Trump’s aim in seeking to 
normalize relations with Russia is to isolate 
China. In return for Moscow’s support against 
Beijing, Putin would be given more leeway in 
Europe – the other economic power that 
Trump has it in for. The Chinese know how 
this could work, because in the 1970s they did 
the exact same thing: Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger normalized Sino-US relations 
in order to balance against the Soviet Union. 
Today, however, it is China that is seen as the 
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 main challenge, and not just by Trump. Trump 
may be focussing on the economic balance of 
power, but many American strategists think of 
China as an actual adversary that is to be 
contained, and with whom there even is a risk 
of war.  
 
The Europeans had the doubtful pleasure of 
welcoming Trump just prior to the Helsinki 
meeting, for the NATO Summit in Brussels 
on 11 July. This summit seemed to mostly 
create risk, for there was nothing of substance 
on the agenda that had not already been 
decided at ministerial level, but Trump could 
have easily derailed it. Luckily, the Alliance 
survived relatively unscathed, mostly because 
Trump this time did not walk away (as he did 
from the G7 meeting in Canada on 9 June) but 
simply convinced himself that everybody had 
fallen in line behind him. The other heads of 
state and government did nothing to dispel 
these “alternative facts”, eager as they all were 
(except one, one presumes) to see Trump 
leave for his subsequent visit to the UK.  
 
In any case, the Trump-Putin meeting 
potentially was the most important one and 
completely overshadowed the NATO Summit 
as soon as it was announced, because the EU, 
like China, feared that Trump and Putin could 
make a deal that would harm its interests. 
Europeans were already picturing themselves 
in the position of Japan and South Korea after 
Trump’s other prominent meeting, with North 
Korean president Kim Jong-un in Singapore 
on 12 June. There he made concessions to 
Pyongyang without consulting Tokyo and 
Seoul, but also without achieving much for the 
US, let alone for global stability.  
 
Some of the immediate concerns that were 
raised just before the Helsinki meeting did not 
materialize: American recognition of the 
Russian annexation of the Crimea, for 
example. Actually, a de facto (though not de 
jure) acceptance could be possible, but not 
without Russian concessions in return, notably 
ending Russian support for the separatist 
rebellion in Eastern Ukraine. A feared deal on 
Syria, that would leave president Assad in 
power without any guarantees for the security 
of Europe’s, and indeed America’s, partners, 
did not come to be either. As it happens, 
Europeans will have to come to terms with the 
fact that Assad will indeed remain – the 
Russian military intervention has ensured that 
– but again, not unconditionally so.  
 
We don’t know what Trump sought to get out 
of his meeting with Putin, and probably never 
will (though there are reports now about what 
Putin proposed to Trump, on arms control). 
But the fact in itself that the president of the 
US sees no reason to debrief his European 
allies is a cause for concern.  
 
GANGING UP ON THE EU  
The biggest threat to the EU has already 
become a reality: a combination of several 
European governments backsliding towards 
authoritarianism, Russian interference, and 
American negligence – or worse.  
 
Under the Trump administration the US has 
stepped up its contribution to NATO’s 
Enhanced Forward Presence and has 
reinforced its troops in Europe. But deterrence 
is all about messaging. The message sent by an 
increased military presence will not have any 
effect if the president of the US himself sends 
a contradictory message at the same time. In 
spite of his heavy-handed rhetoric about 
Germany being a prisoner to Russia (on the 
morning of the NATO Summit), Trump is not 
actually helping the EU confront Russian 
interference in European societies. This means 
that in practice he is already leaving Putin a 
free hand, without obtaining anything in 
return. Worse, Trump and his acolytes are 
actively encouraging right-wing, Eurosceptic 
populism themselves.  
 
This combined anti-EU stance by Trump and 
the European populists is a vital threat to the 
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 cohesion of the Union, and therefore to the 
stability of the European continent. If the EU 
weakens, NATO weakens; tensions within and 
between European countries will rise, and 
foreign powers will see opportunities they just 
might want to grasp. Put differently, Trump is 
helping Putin achieve his aim of weakening 
western cohesion – and both will see what 
chances that may bring them. Trump seems 
willing to risk the stability of Europe for the 
sake of pursuing his simplistic economic 
agenda: buy American or suffer the 
consequences.  
 
The core of the problem is, of course, the 
populist and authoritarian trend in Europe, 
which predates the election of Trump. But the 
risk has become all the greater with his 
election, as right-wing, nationalist populists on 
both sides of the Atlantic reinforce each other, 
and threaten to pull democracy down both in 
Europe and the US.  
 
THE GEOPOLITICS BEHIND THE 
SUMMER’S SUMMITRY  
Great power politics are not as simple as 
Trump seems to think, however. A few highly 
mediatised one-on-one summit meetings 
cannot just wipe out the underlying 
geopolitical realities.  
 
For a start, populism and nationalism go hand 
in hand – Eurosceptics may rave about 
escaping from the reach of Brussels, but not 
all of them are keen to trade it for the harsh 
power of Moscow. The current Polish 
government may feel strengthened in its 
opposition against EU rules and norms by 
Trump’s anti-EU rhetoric. But it would be 
well-advised to reconsider its position in the 
light of the Helsinki meeting. Warsaw has 
antagonised the EU institutions and most 
Western European Member States in the belief 
that it can in any case always rely on the US. 
Where would that leave Poland if Trump 
would now move the US closer to Russia? 
This is the sort of geopolitical reality that a 
tweet cannot undo. Perhaps now is the time 
for the EU to have a frank but magnanimous 
conversation with the Polish government, 
pointing out the geopolitical challenge, and 
emphasizing how Polish sovereignty would 
actually benefit from restoring cordial relations 
with the Brussels institutions and the other EU 
Member States.  
 
Trump’s acolytes are upping the ante, however. 
Steve Bannon, fired from the White House but 
still pursuing the same anti-EU agenda as the 
president, has announced that he will mount a 
campaign in support of Eurosceptical 
populism during next year’s European 
elections. This interference into the electoral 
politics of the EU must not just be firmly 
condemned. The EU institutions, EU Member 
States, and all truly democratic parties (from 
the right, the centre, and the left) must actively 
counter it by highlighting that a vote for those 
whom Bannon supports, is a vote for Trump, 
for his domestic programme (tax cuts for the 
rich at the expense of everybody else), and for 
his foreign policy (letting Putin roam free). 
This is not a time to be faint-hearted: brutal 
disinformation can only be fought with brutal 
honesty.  
 
Trump may think of Russia as a lever he can 
use against Europe, and against China. But on 
my last trip to Moscow (in November 2017) I 
also heard Russian voices pleading for a 
normalisation of relations with the EU. There 
is a feeling that Russian foreign policy is 
leaning too much on one leg, the partnership 
with China, and should be rebalanced by 
restoring links to the EU. There was a slight 
hope, before the Russian presidential elections 
(18 March 2018), that afterwards Putin might 
want to initiate a gradual move in this 
direction, but that was quickly undone by the 
Salisbury incident: the attempted murder of 
former Russian intelligence agent Sergei Skripal 
and his daughter Yulia.  
 
At the same time, Russia will not easily 
abandon the strategic relationship with China, 
even though in economic terms it has proved 
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 disappointing. Moscow may be disturbed by 
Beijing’s growing influence in its southern 
periphery, and in the Russian far east itself, 
and many Russians certainly have difficulty 
accepting the fact that China has outpaced 
them (and many Chinese, in return, are 
irritated because the Russians tend to treat 
them as the inferior partner regardless). But 
precisely because China is now so powerful, it 
is indispensable to have it on its side in what 
Russia perceives as a western-dominated world 
order. Trump’s unpredictability works against 
him here: it only strengthens Russia in its 
assessment of the necessity of the Chinese 
partnership, and it makes it more unlikely that 
Russia will give up on it in return for what can 
only be doubtful benefits, given Trumps 
capriciousness. It takes one to know one: how 
could Putin, who has broken more than one 
promise himself, ever trust an apparently 
equally cynical Trump?  
 
Russo-American cooperation in the Middle 
East is far from evident as well. Trump’s 
desire to escape the Syrian conundrum may 
incline him to look favourably upon a Russian-
inspired solution for the country’s political 
future. But that is bound to include a strong 
role for Iran, Assad’s other ally, while Trump 
sees the regime in Tehran as the enemy, and is 
encouraging Saudi Arabia in its competition 
with Iran for dominance of the Gulf. 
Furthermore, by withdrawing from the Iran 
nuclear deal, Trump has made the EU, China, 
and Russia, who all want to uphold the 
agreement, into objective allies on this issue. If 
an agreement might perhaps be found on Syria 
between the great powers, it is very unlikely 
that any one of them will sign up to the 
broader US strategy for the Middle East and 
the Gulf.  
 
Finally, Trump’s servile attitude to Putin in 
Helsinki provoked a strong reaction within the 
US, notably from the national security 
community, as did his childish attempt to 
reverse his position afterwards (he supposedly 
meant to say “wouldn’t” in “I don’t see any 
reason why it would be Russia”, when talking 
about interference in the US presidential 
elections). The forgotten double negative only 
served to double the outrage. American politics 
are extremely polarized these days, but national 
security is one of the last issues on which both 
sides of the political spectrum can meet. One 
wonders what will happen the day the leaders 
of the American security establishment come 
to the conclusion that the president himself is 
a threat to the national security of the US.  
 
CONCLUSION: FROM SUMMER TO FALL  
A summer of summitry has created neither 
spectacular results nor spectacular disasters. 
But a spectacle it has been, though not a very 
beneficial one for world politics. Trump has 
once again demonstrated his unpreparedness 
for diplomacy (to say the least). He has 
encouraged Putin by his servile stance, and 
created mistrust at the same time, in Russia by 
his quick u-turn after Helsinki, and in China 
and Europe by going to Helsinki without a 
clear agenda in the first place. Meanwhile, he 
has adopted additional sanctions and economic 
measures against Russia, China and the EU, 
thus antagonising everyone.  
 
On my return to Brussels, having spent most 
of the summer in Asia, I somehow feel that 
Europe and the EU came out worst though. 
For one, we were the only ones to have a 
handrail to hold on to, our alliance with the 
US, but Trump has loosened the fittings. We 
probably feel even more uncomfortable than 
the others, therefore, also because of the 
political problems inside the EU. As stated 
above, the US obviously has domestic issues as 
well, and so have Russia and China. Putin has 
been predictably re-elected, but he can stay in 
power only at the cost of continuing to pay off 
his cronies; what happens the day he 
disappears, nobody knows. Xi Jinping is 
tightening the party’s and his personal grip on 
China, but recently has increasingly come 
under criticism, for what public opinion sees as 
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a weak response to Trump’s trade measures, 
and for his lavish spending on diplomatic 
projects (notably in Africa) while people feel 
many of China’s urgent domestic challenges 
remain unanswered. But the EU is the only 
one of today’s four global actors whose 
strategic decision-making is systemically 
flawed, because of the consensual nature of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
 
If Brussels has certainly become aware of the 
challenges posed by great power politics in this 
multipolar world, it is not yet sufficiently acting 
as a great power itself. That leaves it an easy 
prey for the others. Russia will not hesitate to 
opportunistically exploit our internal divisions. 
Neither will China, though at the same time 
my Chinese colleagues, when I asked them 
whether they thought that China would be 
better off without the EU, mostly rather 
preferred not to have to deal with Trump and 
Putin by themselves.  
 
This alone proves that the EU has a role to 
play in great power politics. And it only needs 
the same handrail as the other great powers: its 
own grand strategy.  
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